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FOIA RESPONSE : US EMBASSY
CABLE FROM OFFICER SANTOS AMEMBASSY JB's Commentary. This FOIA response from the State Department discusses many relevant issues and illustrates a different Embassy attitude than we have seen in past responses (which, of course, are a small fraction of the cables generated): "Meanwhile, Morales and his cocaleros have also come across well, non-confrontational, and willing to discuss issues further with the GOB," but the writer also adds: "Behind this friendly facade, of course, exists the possibility that, if talks fail, the cocaleros will escalate the confrontation and undertake blockades of the vital Cochabamba-Santa Cruz road." Still, this discourse is far more reasonable than ex-Ambassador Rocha's open hostility. Cocaleros "have insisted upon a survey of domestic use of coca" and the government side responded by offering "copies of recent studies, including the study by the reputable Gallup-type group CELIN" which was a product of Embassy money and influence, and which, in the estimation of all observers outside the Embassy that this author has spoken with, provides an very inaccurate picture of coca use in Bolivia. |
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Cocaleros have been long
calling for the expanded marketing of coca products (and they don't mean
cocaine) in order to provide a fuller employment for Bolivians since coca is
the ONLY plant that grows well in a few critical areas, such as the Chapare
and the Yungas. Here is what the FOIA response says about that and another
important issue: Finally, the China Card: A truly interesting issue is the possibility of exporting coca tea to China. "The export of coca tea to other markets, for example to China as explained by GOB officials, is also to be explored." Here one can see that it was also being discussed at the highest levels of the Bolivian government in their talks with the Embassy, and that the Embassy was deeming it worthy of consideration. Perhaps the worst part of this cable is that it seems to be written with a strange and unreal "neutral" viewpoint. The reality is that what is being reported isn't a spat between two sides in an issue reported by a neutral agent, but the actions of the writer's agent against the cocaleros, as the writer of the cable is not a neutral party, but a very powerful player representing the US. |
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To: SECSTATE WASHDC - PRIORITY September 18, 2002 Action: INL From: AMEMBASSY LA PAZ (LA PAZ 3378 - PRIORITY) Subject: PRESIDENT MEETS WITH EVO MORALES; MORE NEGOTIATIONS SCHEDULED, GOB SETS STRATEGY 1. (SBU) Summary: President Sanchez de Lozada and cocalero leader Evo Morales held their long publicized meeting on September 13 in Cochabamba (reftel A). The session lasted nearly four hours and was portrayed positively in the weekend media. Both sides have agreed to form "commissions" to discuss the entire gamut of coca-related issues beginning this week. The GOB has staked out a favorable public relations position as essentially willing to go the extra mile to negotiate. Meanwhile, the two essential cocalero demands - an end to eradication and "demilitarization of the Chapare," - still appear to be the ultimate deal-breakers. End Summary. 2. (U) Both the cocaleros and the GOB reaped positive media coverage after the four-hour meeting held between the two sides on September 13. They agreed to form commissions and meet again this weekend to discuss eradication, the "demilitarization of the Chapare," "the industrialization of coca," and alternative development. [REDACTED HALF PARAGRAPH] GOB gains the high ground 3. (SBU) The GOB has positioned itself well going into these negotiations. It has shown itself to be forthcoming and willing to initiate a dialogue with the cocaleros of Evo Morales. It has treated Morales with respect. The GOB has listened to a long list of cocalero complaints and baa agreed to form commissions to discuss these issues further beginning this week. This has, in fact, been an integral part of the GOB strategy. If talks fail, the GOB will be seen as having made every effort to go the extra mile to avoid confrontation. Meanwhile, Morales and his cocaleros have also come across well, non-confrontational, and willing to discuss issues further with the GOB. Behind this friendly facade, of course, exists the possibility that, if talks fail, the cocaleros will escalate the confrontation and undertake blockades of the vital Cochabamba-Santa Cruz road. A GOB strategy takes shape 4. (SBU) Vice Minister of Social Defense Ernesto Justiniano and a small group of like-minded engineers have outlined what is essentially a complex order of rhetorical battle. Their major objective is to ‘secure social peace and maintain a strong counter-narcotics policy. The crux of the issue is whether or not these two objectives are mutually incompatible. They have outlined a long list of "obligatory objectives" and "desirable objectives." Two rooms of the Vice Minister’s suite of office are papered over with poster-sized signs covered in red, blue and green magic marker describing various strategies and tactics to bring about the main objective. 5. (U) The cocaleros, for example, have insisted upon a survey of domestic use of coca. Justiniano’s group had copies of recent studies, including a study by the reputable Gallup-type group CELIN indicating domestic usage is only a little more than 5,000 hectares per year (Law 1008 permits up to 12,000 hectares for domestic consumption). The Vice Minister’s commission is prepared to provide this information to the cocalero delegation, though, in reality, a new study would not be unwelcome. 6. (U) The cocaleros have suggested further discussions on the "industrialization of coca, essentially finding other markets for coca. Coca toothpaste has been suggested, though we doubt this has much of a future. This approach has been tried before with no success. In the end, the only thing coca can produce effectively, except for coca tea, is cocaine. The export of coca tea to other markets, for example, to china as explained to us by GOB officials, is also to be explored. Essentially a Political Problem 7. (SBU) Despite the best efforts of the Vice-Minister of Social Defense to approach this in a logical linear manner, the bottom line is that this is essentially a political issue, requiring a political solution. As per reftels, we believe Morales is hesitant to play his trump card - call for a nationwide blockade - because of the political negatives inherent in such a move. However, as long as he holds to his two essentially non-negotiable demands - an end to eradication and the demilitarization of the Chapare - and refuses to be accommodated by other concessions on the part of the GOB, Morales may see no choice but to escalate the conflict. The GOB's challenge will be to make coins creative concessions without compromising on the crucial issue, and to provide Morales something to take to his people and claim "victory". [REDACTED PARAGRAPH] 8. (SBU) It is hard to see a palatable way out of this situation. Both aides have invested a great deal and both sides need a way out that would satisfy their particular constituencies. The GOB and the cocaleros could buy additional time by prolonging these discussions as the commissions continue to pursue the relevant issues. But, as one GOB official said with some dismay, "As long as they (the cocaleros) insist on a halt to eradication and demilitarization of the Chapare, I don t see a peaceful way out of this." P 181523Z SEP 02 FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ |