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APPROVED FOR RELEASE ORIGINAL DATE: SEP 2003 Colombia’s Insurgents: Assessment of Their Role in the Drug Trade A Joint Intelligence Report This paper is an interagency product. It was coordinated by analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Director, Crime and Narcotics Center, REDACTED Colombia s Insurgents: Assessment of Their Role in the Drug Trade Key Judgments Information available as of 1 September 1996 was used in this report. Colombia’s guerrilla groups are exploiting drug-related activities to fill their coffers and are diversifying their roles in the narcotics trade; however, they are not and are unlikely to become an independent drug-trafficking syndicate. REDACTED SENTENCE involvement by some elements of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) in almost all levels of the drug trade in Colombia, with their primary activity centered on supporting trafficker operations and providing security. The FARC is most heavily involved in southeastern Colombia, and the ELN in the northeast. Some rebel groups also engage in small-scale independent cultivation-processing, and marketing ventures, and, although a few fronts may independently ship limited amounts of narcotics into neighboring countries, they do. not directly participate in the marketing and sales of drugs in the United States or Europe. This paper reviews all currently available reporting on the subject, but the spotty and incomplete nature of the information makes some judgments on the full extent of guerrilla involvement in narcotrafficking difficult to assess: |
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Nonetheless, the Colombian armed forces’ assertion that the guerrillas have become a “third cartel” that may wield more power than the Cali mafia – which has overseen an international drug production, transportation, wholesale distribution, and money-laundering operation—is exaggerated. Indeed, rebel leaders are driven by social, political, and personal agendas and do not appear to have the motivation to transform their organization into a drug mafia: • The FARC and ELN have not consolidated themselves into an international trafficking network that can complete multiton deals and exert national-level political influence. • A Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) analysis of seized documents used by the Colombian Army as proof that the FARC is an independent trafficking organization concluded that the reports showed payments received for security services but that they lacked several critical components expected in the records of a drug syndicate. • Although limited reporting suggests some rebel groups independently transport and market drugs to Colombia s neighbors, there is no solid information on the involvement of FARC or ELN in the transportation, distribution, or marketing of illicit drugs in the United States or Europe. REDACTED The FARC and ELN, nonetheless, are likely to turn increasingly to the drug trade to expand their power and resources, and greater numbers of rebels probably will become involved in narcotics-related activities, compounding problems for the Samper administration and its counternarcotics efforts: • They will continue to further the drug trade by protecting and assisting traffickers and may try to expand their independent ventures in drug cultivation, production, and transportation in Colombia. • Attempted expansion and continued extortion of "war taxes" from traffickers probably will ensure some friction between traffickers and guerrillas; however, the two groups have a strong alliance of convenience. • Guerrilla leaders most likely will lack the motivation, sophistication, and organization to threaten the domination of the established trafficking groups. It is doubtful either the FARC or ELN will develop the infrastructure needed to establish their own distribution networks in the United States or Europe, and their activities are unlikely to have a direct impact on the flow of drugs into the United States. REDACTED
Colombia's Insurgents: Assessment of Their Role in the Drug Trade REDACTED Insurgents and Drugs: Basic Scope and Military Claims REDACTED The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)— Colombia’s largest guerrilla groups—participate in drug-related activities and are diversifying their roles in the narcotics trade. The FARC leadership blessed involvement in the drug trade in the early 1980s. REDACTED WORDS and a variety of reporting shows some ELN participation in drug activities despite its official opposition to the narcotic business. The rebels not only extort money from traffickers, growers, and laboratory owners who work in areas under longstanding guerrilla control – continuing a tradition of exacting "war taxes" from business enterprises in their zones of operation – but also provide security services to assist traffickers in processing and transporting narcotics. While the guerrillas have supported trafficker ventures. REDACTED WORDS REDACTED WORDS some rebel units are independently involved in localized – probably small-scale – cultivation, processing, transporting, and marketing of narcotics and provide support to the opium, heroin, and marijuana trades in addition to cocaine: REDACTED WORDS the FARC – which has grown from 14 fronts in 1978 to some 64 today – has created several fronts solely to develop cultivation and protection ventures. REDACTED WORDS estimate that at least 50 percent of FARC and and 30 percent of ELN fronts participate to some degree in drug-related activities, mainly protection; the community cannot independently corroborate these estimates. REDACTED The insurgent-trafficker relationship is characterized by conflict and cooperation, and traffickers do not rely solely on guerrillas for their muscle: • In the 1980s, for example, traffickers allied with rightwing death squads killed guerrilla sympathizers. • In 1992, a feud developed when insurgents kidnapped the sister of Cali kingpin Jose Santacruz Londono REDACTED It is difficult to assess how much revenue the guerrillas make from their drug-related activities or to quantify rebel involvement. REDACTED Colombian Army estimates of rebel proceeds in the first half of 1995 have ranged from $1.5 million for a combination of trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, robberies, and various investments to $647 million for narcotics-related activities alone. Drug revenues almost certainly have helped the rebels strengthen their financial position and better equip their organizations and may have attracted new members to their ranks – which had dwindled in the 1970s. Government statistics indicate the number of guerrillas increased by about 20 percent between 1991 and 1994 to more than 10,000 fighters. REDACTED The Colombian military has expressed strong concerns about the rebel’s roles in drug trafficking, but their claims are exaggerated. In February, Army Cornmander Bedoya called the FARC the newest drug "cartel," with ties to the Cali mafia and extending to Peru. Some military officers REDACTED WORDS have said that the rebels already exceed the power and size of the Call mafia. Armed forces officials have said that the rebels are independent cultivators, processors, and marketers of narcotics who "control" the activities of other traffickers who operate in their areas of influence by charging war taxes. According to diplomatic reporting, Army sources have also said that up to 90 percent of the FARC is involved in trafficking, that the guerrillas have become dedicated almost exclusively to trafficking in drugs, and that the rebels receive most of their income from trafficking as opposed to other activities such as kidnapping, robbery, and extortion. REDACTED |
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Protection of Narcotrafficking Activities. The largest single rebel connection to drug trafficking has centered on providing protection to others involved in the drug business. Guerrilla fronts in virtually all departments where traffickers operate provide security services—for coca, poppy, and marijuana fields; clandestine labs; and airstrips – in exchange for money or weapons, or they protect trafficker ventures by promising to "maintain order." The guerrillas collect fees not only for real security services but also for guarantees that they will not conduct operations that would upset trafficking activity occurring in their strongholds – an extension of the rebel tradition of taxing business enterprises such as cattle ranching, in their zones of control. REDACTED WORDS rebel attacks on counternarcotics operations indicate the priority placed on protecting their drug-related interests. Rebels have shot at – and once in the last year have shot down – eradication spray planes in coca growing regions and, often in collusion with traffickers, have organized peasant protests against government eradication efforts. REDACTED Specific reports on guerrilla drug protection activity in recent years include: • In July 1996, REDACTED WORDS the 27th FARC front was providing security for narcotics shipments arriving and departing from Miraflores in Guaviare. The FARC was also protecting an airstrip used by an Eastern Plains trafficker in Vichada, arranging artificial foliage as camouflage after its use. • In Caqueta, which the government has virtually relinquished to narcotraffickers and rebels REDACTED WORDS the southern bloc of the FARC has become “exceedingly rch" by taxing legitimate and illicit commerce and assisting narcotics traffickers by providing security for coca fields, cocaine labs, and precursor storage areas. For instance, the 14th FARC front ensures the smooth running of market days, when traffickers buy cocaine base from campesinos, charging buyers 20 percent of the purchase price REDACTED WORDS the 13th and 14th FARC fronts collected $20 to $30 for each kilogram of cocaine HC1 produced at traffickers. Caqueta laboratories and that rebels have charged traffickers $3,000 per airstrip use. • REDACTED WORDS in 1995 guerrillas from the 6th FARC front in Valle del Cauca negotiated a nonaggression pact in several municipalities with Cali and Northern Valle traffickers, opium buyers, and poppy growers. The guerrillas maintain roadblocks and other security measures in order to control common crime and to prevent surprise attacks by government forces. • In the last two years REDACTED WORDS that 50 FARC members nave guaruea two cocaine base laboratories in Cauca; guerrillas from the 14th and 15th fronts were protecting two cocaine HCl laboratories in Caqueta; rebels guarded a laboratory in Meta; and the FARC protected a hashish oil laboratory in La Guajira, a cocaine base laboratory in Bolivar, and a Cali-owned processing laboratory and airstrip in Putumayo. • REDACTED WORDS the FARC has conducted security operations over the years for several Cali traffickers—including Pacho Herrera, the Urdinolas, and the Grajales family – and has guarded property and transshipment points for Luis "Miki" Ramirez. Similarly REDACTED WORDS say that deceased Medellin kingpin Pablo Escobar may have hired ELN members to provide personal security following his 1992 escape from prison. REDACTED WORDS Escobar in 1990 hired the ELN to kidnap journalist Diana Turbay, who was later killed in a rescue attempt. • REDACTED WORDS traffickers pay the FARC and the ELN protection from security services while transporting cocaine from storage sites in the interior to ships at Buenaventura. The traffickers reportedly "deal severely" with insurgents if business is interrupted. • REDACTED WORDS the FARC has provided protection for a group coordinating cocaine base shipments for the Cali mafia. The FARC taxed pilots in return for assurances that guerrilla activities would cease when airstrips were in use. Cultivation of Coca, Poppies, and Cannabis. Some FARC and ELN fronts are involved in drug cultivation, but it is difficult to distinguish between support services – guarding fields under the control of traffickers – and actual rebel cultivation of the fields: • REDACTED WORDS a FARC presence at poppy fields Cuaca, Huila, Quindio, and Tolima departments. In May 1996 REDACTED WORDS the 18th and 35th FARC fronts cultivated coca on a 60-hectare plantation in Cordoba. • According to the press, the Army claimed in March 1996 that the 6th front was growing cannabis in northern Valle del Cauca and had stopped guarding crops belonging to traffickers to produce and market heir own shipments in order to control the profits. • In l994 REDACTED WORDS the Urdinolas negotiated truces with the 6th FARC front and local ELN guerrillas to allow rebels to cultivate opium poppies on trafficker properties, dividing the harvest. REDACTED WORDS Processing of Drugs. The Colombian military often reports guerrilla ownership of cocaine base and cocaine HCl laboratories, and limited intelligence reporting suggests that some groups probably have the capability to produce cocaine independently. Reports |
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Figure 1 Coca Growing Areas, 1995
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Figure 2 Opium Poppy Growing Areas, 1995
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on rebel-owned laboratories rarely give a sense of their size or capabilities, but production probably is small-scale. The bulk of rebel involvement in drug processing most likely remains providing assistance and protection to traffickers in return for a percentage of the proceeds: • In July 1996 REDACTED WORDS Colomban Army intelligence had received unconfirmed reports that the ELN ran five cocaine laboratories on its headquarters compound in Santander and owned a complex of laboratories and fields in Bolivar department. If true, this information suggests a greater ELN role in independent drug processing and cultivation than prior reporting has indicated. • In June 1996 REDACTED WORDS the Army received a report of a large camp in Guaviare manned by 1st FARC front guerrillas and containing a coca base laboratory. REDACTED WORDS the camp was one of the best indications to date of FARC involvement in the cocaine trade, but when the military raided the camp weeks later, no FARC personnel were present. • In April 1996 REDACTED WORDS the 14th and 15th FARC fronts owned and operated a cocaine HCl laboratory in Caqueta. • REDACTED WORDS the 3rd, 13th, and 61st FARC fronts were growing and processing opium poppies in Magdelena department. The guerrillas processed small quantities of heroin. REDACTED WORDS Movement of Essential Chemicals. Reporting does not indicate any notable level of guerrilla involvement in this activity. REDACTED Movement of Drugs. Sparse reporting suggests that the FARC and ELN probably assist traffickers in moving drugs internally and across Colombia s borders and may independently ship limited amounts of narcotics short distances or into neighboring countries. REDACTED Internal. Some insurgent groups reportedly have helped traffickers store and transport cocaine within Colombia. In April,REDACTED WORDS that the 34th and 57th FARC fronts helped move cocaine from the interior to the coast. In 1994, DEA confidential informants reported that the Medellin mafia had recruited ELN members to transport cocaine from a farm in Antioquia to the port city of Turbo and that the 19th FARC front was guarding a 900-kilogram cocaine shipment scheduled for transport to the north coast. International. Direct guerrilla involvement in exporting drugs appears minimal. The DEA has no credible indication that the FARC or ELN is indeed involved in transportation, distribution, or marketing of illicit drugs in the United States and Europe. It is difficult to know if the limited reports of FARC participation in such shipments – primarily provided by the Colombian military – refer to independent ventures or support to traffickers, who probably at times use FARC and ELN personnel as mules to transport drugs abroad. FARC and ELN elements – particularly those located near the Venezuelan, Panamanian, and Ecuadorian borders – probably can independently export limited quantities of locally produced cocaine. REDACTED WORDS an Army officer claimed in July that two Northern Valle traffickers met with paramilitary leaders to discuss a plan to prevent the FARC from establishing narcotics transportation routes to Mexico; however, it was not clear whether the FARC was actively trying to set up such networks or whether the traffickers were making contingency plans. REDACTED SENTENCES REDACTED WORDS regarding alleged insurgent involvement at the international level. For example: • In Mav 1994 REDACTED WORDS the 19th FARC front was preparing to transport 200 kilograms of cocaine to Nicaragua. Further DEA investigations, however, did not provide any corroboration of this alleged FARC cocaine-smuggling operation. • In May 1993, REDACTED WORDS individuals linked to an unspecified FARC front had 5 metric tons of cocaine warehoused near the Panamanian border ready for shipment. DEA has developed no independent information to corroborate this report. REDACTED WORDS Marketing and Sales of Drugs. Guerrilla involvement in this activity appears minimal and mostly on the local level REDACTED WORDS in July that FARC cocaine distribution cells have worked in the United States for 10 years, the informant had no details or firsthand knowledge. Internal. One military officer reported last year that guerrillas and traffickers have a classic wholesale/retail relationship in which rebels grow and produce heroin and cocaine, and sell it to traffickers, who retail it internationally – although the defense attache says that the source may be overstating the guerrillas business savvy and influence. REDACTED SENTENCES International. REDACTED WORDS reports this year have discussed Colombian insurgent involvement in selling drugs in Panama, but the scant information suggests that any such activity probably is small-scale and infrequent. Although guerrillas guard cultivation areas and drug laboratories near Colombia’s generally porous and poorly defined borders, reporting does not suggest significant drug-related activity outside the country: • In March,REDACTED WORDS the FARC conducts trafficking in Panama using a former officer of Noriega’s Panamanian Defense Force as a contact.REDACTED SENTENCES REDACTED WORDS a Colombian national connected to the FARC reportedly smuggles cocaine from Pnama to Miami in small containers shaped to resemble honeydew melons REDACTED WORDS the FARC has also used boats to transport drugs from Colombia to Panama and the United States REDACTED WORDSa Colombian national connected to the FARC reportedly smuggles cocaine from Panama to Miami in small containers shaped to resemble honeydew melons REDACTED WORDS the FARC has also used boats to transport drugs from Colombia to Panama and the United States REDACTED WORDS the FARC has a four-man cell that stays in a. Panama hotel for two to three months at a time to conduct drug-related and other business – including weapons purchases and assassinations. • In April, REDACTED WORDS the ELN planned to expand activity into Panama but canceled a meeting arranged by the FARC with its Panamanian contact. REDACTED Movement and Laundering of Drug Monies. Although the rebels probably are not significantly involved in money laundering thus far, some activity has been reported. REDACTED WORDS FARC trafficking activity in Panama says that money from Panamanian narcotics sales is laundered through a business in the Colon Free Zone. In June 1995, a REDACTED WORDS Insurgents Not a Rival "Cartel"...REDACTED The reporting cited suggests that Colombian military claims that the guerrillas have become a "third cartel" – an independent multitiered drug syndicate that processes narcotics and moves and markets large quantities of drugs domestically and internationally – are exaggerated. Even if several FARC fronts have the ability to run independent drug laboratories and locally transport and market base or cocaine HCI produced there, they do not appear to operate at, or even near, the level of trafficking groups such as Cali, Medellin, or Northern Valle: • The FARC and ELN are not international traffickers who set prices, transport drugs worldwide, complete. multiton deals, launder large sums of money, spend millions of dollars to gain national-level political influence, or operate a wide network of legitimate business enterprises. Revenues earned by the rebels—while probably significant to meeting guerrilla needs—pale in comparison to Cali. • There is no evidence that the traffickers allow the rebels to dictate how they run their business. Traffickers who pay the rebels "taxes" probably view the fees as part of the cost of doing business. Much as traffickers pay off government officials, they pay off the guerrillas who serve as the de facto government in remote areas Bogota cannot control. • REDACTED WORDS the rebels do not engage solely in narcotics-related activities, but they also conduct traditional operations, such as kidnappings, robberies, harassing security services, and attacking infrastructure. • REDACTED PARAGRAPH • REDACTED PARAGRAPH • REDACTED PARAGRAPH
...But Rebel Involvement in Drugs Will Persist REDACTED The FARC and ELN, nonetheless, are likely to increasingly rely on the lucrative drug trade to try to expand their power and resources, and greater numbers of rebels probably will become involved in narcotics-related activities. The guerrillas will continue to facilitate the drug trade by protecting trafficker infrastructure, assisting trafficking operations, and complicating government counternarcotics operations: • Proceeds from drugs may allow the guerrillas to increase their strength. Although they almost certainly will remain unable to overthrow the government, increased membership and better equipment would allow them to become a bigger problem for Bogota. who are already concerned about violence levels. • Ties to the insurgents give many traffickers more firepower in retaliating against government antidrug efforts. If drug proceeds allow the rebels to better arm themselves, they will be more effective in harassing security services and deterring both counternarcotics and counterinsurgency efforts. Guemllas can also capitalize on their support in the peasantry to organize large-scale, disruptive protests against eradication efforts. Over the longer term, some rebels, whose politically based ideological moorings have weakened or even evaporated, might become enveloped by drug syndicates to the extent that they belong more to the trafficking organizations than to rebel groups. The rebels may try to expand autonomous efforts to cultivate, process, and market narcotics in order to reap greater profits, but their independent narcotics activities are likely to remain limited and will not significantly increase the flow of drugs to the United States: • Although information on the organization of rebel narcotics activities is limited, the guerrillas do not appear to have developed sophisticated ventures. On the whole, the rebels are less educated and have less business savvy than major traffickers, and the rebel leadership has other agendas and appears to lack the motivation to transform its groups into a drug-trafficking organization. It is doubtful that either the FARC or ELN will develop the international transportation or logistic infrastructure necessary to establish independent drug distribution networks in the United States or Europe. • Despite Colombian military fears, there is no indication at this time that the guerrillas are actively beefing up their independent activities to take advantage of possible weaknesses in the Cali organization following the Cali kingpin arrests. The rebels would be hard pressed to compete head-on with more experienced traffickers and are unlikely to challenge the domination of the major drug syndicates. REDACTED Although sporadic friction between the traffickers and the guerrillas will occur and rivalries will develop, particularly in areas where insurgents dominate, the two groups have developed an alliance of convenience. Counternarcotics operations have tended to strengthen the trafficker-rebel relationship in many areas by giving a common enemy to unify against. Nevertheless, even if the alliance frays between some groups of rebels and traffickers, it is unlikely to diminish permanently the ability of the drug mafias to process and ship narcotics internationally. REDACTED |
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Figure 3 Colombia: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Units
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Table A-1 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)REDACTED
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Table A-1 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) REDACTED (continued)
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Table A-2 National Liberation Army (ELN) REDACTED
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Figure 4 Colombia: National Liberation Army (ELN) Order of Battle REDACTED
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Table A-2 National Liberation Army (ELN)REDACTED (continued)
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